galvanize those within the research, regulatory, and pharmaceutical communities to provide access to AIDS drugs through special distribution programs, and to accelerate AIDS drug and vaccine development. 3 If these goals are to be realized, a radical change in the approach taken toward the research, approval, and marketing of new drugs may be required. Speeding up the drug approval process may mean the utilization of patients in high-risk clinical experimentation. Moreover, drug availability and pricing policies may depend on the ability of manufacturers to limit their own liability. The consequences of these issues extend beyond the AIDS epidemic and influence the extent to which the drug development process will be able to respond to disease victims in the future. As scientific progress towards an AIDS vaccine 4 begins to generate significant media attention and public interest, it is important to remain aware of the obstacles present in developing a successful vaccine for the prevention of AIDS. Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of pharmaceutical product development and oversight of this process within the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). Part II analyzes the dilemma the manufacturers face when using human subjects in vaccine testing. Part III discusses liability risks for potential AIDS vaccine manufacturers. 5 Power (ACT UP). He has described the tactics used by the coalition:
We have protests, which include taking over the opening plenary session of the AIDS conference in Montreal, blocking the Golden Gate Bridge and protesting endlessly at city hall here in New York. We have telephone zaps where we tie up switchboards. We purchased millions of dollars of tickets when Northwest Airlines refused to carry AIDS people as passengers, tickets that weren't paid for, of course.
Simpson, UsingRage to Fight the Plague, TIME, Feb. 5, 1990, at 7 (providing additional accounts of confrontational tactic; employed by ACT UP).
3 See Marsa, Phoenix Risin g OMNI, Dec. 1989, at 51, 54-58. 4 Vaccination is a method of inducing immunity by the injection of a suspension of attenuated or killed microorganisms, including viruses.
The classic approach to developing a vaccine is to devise an immunogen that invokes an immune response [including antibody production] that can prevent absolutely the initial infection .... Some vaccines may be initially infected with a wild-type micro-organism; however, because of vaccineinduced immunity, the person may develop only a subclinical infection. Thus, a vaccine may also be designed to prevent the development of disease once the person is infected. Lastly, once disease is present, [some vaccines] may be used to bolster immunity and prevent the progression of disease. 5 See infra text following note 68.
These risks are complicated by the courts' failure to establish a uniform way to evaluate high-risk therapeutic products, thereby making it difficult for manufacturers to determine whether they will be immune from strict liability claims. 6 Part IV discusses possible future solutions for removing the legal barriers to AIDS vaccine development. And finally, this Comment concludes that the successful development and distribution of an AIDS vaccine requires a united effort among manufacturers, lawmakers, and regulators. A safe and effective vaccine can reach the marketplace only if legal obstacles are removed.
As legal strategies are developed to deal with an AIDS vaccine, it must be remembered that bringing this product through development will not be an easy task. Researchers and regulators will have to work overtime, and the obstacles they face should not be discounted.
I. FROM THE LABORATORY TO THE MARKETPLACE: AN OVERVIEW OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
To appreciate fully the concerns surrounding the licensing of new vaccines, it is necessary to understand the federal administrative process by which pharmaceutical products move from the laboratory to the marketplace. The following discussion will provide a brief overview of this process.
Pursuant to its statutory mandate under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 7 the FDA has promulgated both procedural and substantive regulations for the approval of all drug products. 8 Vaccines fall within a category of drugs known as overcome and a promising new drug has been identified, and has successfully undergone toxicological testing in animals, the pharmaceutical manufacturer files a "Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug (IND)" with the FDA. 12 This signals the company's intention to begin clinical testing of the new product, and also begins the FDA's review process.' 3 Following IND submission, the FDA has thirty days to evaluate the application and determine whether safety problems exist. 14 If safety requirements are met, clinical testing in human subjects can begin. 15 Clinical testing in human subjects is conducted in four phases, three of which occur prior to approval for generalized usage and marketing of the product. 16 The first of these phases is consid-1990, at 5. Although early pessimism is receding, technical problems continue to retard progress in designing a vaccine that will provide either immunity or a more favorable long term clinical experience for those immunized.
12 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1990) . 13 Until recently, the FDA was the only regulatory body to grant an investigational exemption, d 6 ing so only after determining that a drug's potential benefits justified 15 Federal regulations require researchers to obtain the informed consent of subjects before commencing clinical testing. See infra text accompanying notes 53-67 (discussing informed consent). 16 These phases are as follows: Phase I: The first phase of human testing is directed at determining the safe dosage range for a drug, the ways it is absorbed into the body, and possible levels of toxicity. These tests are usually conducted on 20-80 normal, healthy volunteers.
Phase II: The second phase of human testing is performed on closely monitored patients to learn more about the drug's safety and effectiveness. The number of patients monitored in this phase depends on the nature of the drug but seldom is more than 200. Most Phase II testing is directed at treatment or prevention of a specific disease. Additional animal testing is usually undertaken to gain further safety information. If the tests show the drug may be useful in treating a disease and the long-term animal testing indicates no unwarranted harm, the sponsor [the pharmaceutical company] then proceeds to phase III.
Phase III: This phase involves the most extensive testing. Phase III studies are intended to assess the safety, effectiveness, and most desirable ered nontherapeutic, while the remaining three phases often provide some therapeutic benefit to the participants. 17 Following the successful completion of Phase III, the pharmaceutical company submits a new drug application (NDA) for FDA approval.' 8 The new product is given a chemical and therapeutic classification and submitted to experts in the FDA review disciplines. 1 9 The FDA then has 180 days to review the application.
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Additional information may be requested from the pharmaceutical company; hence, the total review period occasionally exceeds 180 days. Application approval is based, in principle, upon the existence of a substantial body of evidence supporting the product's effectiveness as well as the demonstrated safety of the product for its intended use.
21 " [T] his mandate necessitates an evaluation of the relation between benefit and risk .... which in turn requires evaluation of the relation between the pharmacologic effect of a [product] and the benefit presumed to derive from this effect." 22 The FDA is permitted a certain amount of subjective judgment in dosage of the drug in treating a specific disease in a large group of patients (usually several hundred to several thousand, depending on the drug). During Phase III, the drug is used the way it would be administered when marketed. Additional testing intended to define more specifically any drugrelated adverse effects is also done in Phase II. 17 Consider the following: Experimentation involving human research subjects has at least two subcategories: therapeutic and nontherapeutic. Therapeutic experimentation using a human subject may be defined as that experimentation which has as a goal providing a direct benefit (effective medical therapy) to the subject-patient. In contrast, nontherapeutic experimentation is not directed toward providing a benefit to the subject but is concerned with the discovery of data through the research on the human subject. its evaluation, and as a result conflict often surrounds the approval process. Once a pharmaceutical product has met FDA requirements and has been granted approval, the manufacturing company may begin marketing and sales. 2 " The company, however, is not out of the FDA's jurisdiction. Experimental documentation continues to be accumulated during Phase IV trials, 24 and the company is responsible for submitting this information to the FDA in scheduled annual reports for the remaining life of the patent. 25 Through its monitoring of the product's marketing experience, the FDA ensures that unfavorable effects are minimized and that labeling reflects any adverse reactions or contraindications.
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Pharmaceutical product development is a long, tedious, and expensive process. A recent survey estimated that development time now averages twelve years, while costs average 231 million U.S. dollars for each new product. 2 7 Since the combined annual revenues generated by all vaccines have fallen to between 200 million 28 and 547 million 29 U.S. dollars in recent years, an AIDS vaccine could easily take many years to show a profit for the pharmaceutical company. Therapeutic liability, 30 24 The post-marketing, or Phase IV, clinical trials allow the measurement of variables not adequately assessed during Phase III research. For instance, the regimens and clinical situations studied during Phase III do not always correlate with those in which the product will be utilized after marketing. Also, even the large number of patients involved in Phase III trials are not fully representative of the treatment population-rare yet serious side effects may not be perceived until after marketing. In addition to monitoring safety issues, the pharmaceutical company looks for possible new indications; that is, the discovery of secondary effects which might permit use in a new population. Regulatory approval of such usage would result in increased utilization and higher profits for the company. See Townsend, 
II. DILEMMAS FOR MANUFACTURERS DURING CLINICAL

DEVELOPMENT: THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN AIDS VACCINE TESTING
The technical hurdles associated with preclinical vaccine development have not impeded all progress toward an available HIV vaccine. Preliminary human trials with a vaccine produced by MicroGeneSys, Inc. began in September of 1987, 3 and since that time, testing of additional vaccine candidates has been proceeding in the United States and abroad.
3 4 As the development of an AIDS vaccine moves through the various phases of human testing, manufacturers will be attempting to design clinical protocols that favorably balance harms and benefits to participants. In so doing they will face two challenges: (1) applying the legal precepts of informed consent to potentially vulnerable human subject populations; 35 and (2) predicting the liability costs arising from failures to apply these precepts successfully. [AIDS] vaccine products are in clinical trials, and several more are being tested on animals.").
-" "'Human subject' means an individual who is or becomes a participant in research, either as a recipient of the test article or as a control. A subject may be either a healthy individual or a patient." 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(21)(e) (1990). 6 The doctrine was developed in medical malpractice law, but has been applied by analogy to clinical experimentation. This analogy is not perfect, however, and the requirements of informed consent may be even more compelling under experimental conditions. The salient differences between clinical experimentation and medical treatment have been described as follows:
In the investigator-subject relationship, the primary purpose is to gain knowledge; the direct benefit to the subject may be nil, minor, or even beneficial, but is in any case subsidiary. The investigator may or may not be a physician; the subject may or may not be a patient. Informed consent may embody a number of elements, 40 but generally requires that a research subject (or her authorized representative) be competent to agree voluntarily to a risk about which she is knowledgeable. Since it is the duty of the sponsor of a clinical trial to effectuate these requirements, 4 1 lack of informed consent is likely to constitute the major factor leading to manufacturer liability during the course of vaccine trials. 41 The regulations contain a broad definition of "sponsor," including an individual, pharmaceutical company, governmental agency, academic institution, private organization, or other organization. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (1990). Under the regulations, the sponsor's duty to obtain informed consent is clear: "no investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by these regulations unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative." Id. § 50.20.
42 See generally Thompson, Protecting 'Human Guinea Pigs,'FDA CONSUMER, Dec.-Jan. 1987, at 15 (noting that while the "FDA does not require that subjects be compensated if there is injury or other untoward result.., in any study that involves more than minimal risk, subjects must be told before they enter the study whether compensation and medical treatment will be provided and what that compensation Given the manner in which modern courts have dealt with the informed consent issue in medical research, it is likely that breaches of the duty to obtain informed consent during either nontherapeutic or therapeutic research will be actionable under a negligence standard. 43 While this standard is lower than the strict liability standard that could exist for vaccine manufacturers who reach the market with their products, 44 a negligence standard may still be problematic. First, it may be difficult for manufacturers to determine the appropriate type and amount of information that must be disclosed to subjects in order to meet the knowledge requirement. 45 Although federal regulations set out the elements of informed consent for federally funded experiments, 46 the regulations do not preempt applicable state or local laws. 47 Additionally, not all experiments will be federally funded, and therefore federal will be or how to obtain information about it"). informed consent regulations premised on federal funding may not apply. 48 Since federal regulations may be neither applicable nor controlling, the knowledge requirement may be significantly determined by statutes that speak to the issue of informed consent and articulate specific disclosure standards. The doctrine of informed consent, as developed with regard to patient procedures generally, indicates that there will be subtle yet significant jurisdictional distinctions as to whether the appropriate standard of disclosure is: (1) information that a reasonable investigator would disclose; 4 9 (2) information that a reasonable subject would want to know; 50 (3) information about which the individual subject involved in testing would wish to be apprised; 5 1 or (4) information that a reasonable subject with the characteristics of the individual involved in testing would wish to know.
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Second, it may be difficult for manufacturers to satisfy the requirement of voluntariness 53 as they attempt to provide legally adequate informed consent to the selected subjects. The selection of subjects has already focused on one of several high-risk populations. 54 Certain high-risk populations-intravenous drug users, HIV-infected women and men, partners of infected individuals (including prostitutes), and prisoners or mentally incompetent subjects who fall into the foregoing categories-are probably the 129 (1989) (noting that medical scientists involved in planning initial vaccine trials have reportedly suggested that gay men were the appropriate subjects because "their physiology has been altered as a result of their lifestyle and because they will be the first to benefit from an effective vaccine"). least likely to have the capacity to withstand coercion or undue influence. 55 Many individuals within high-risk, or otherwise suspect subpopulations often lack: (1) access to a public forum where they can voice their grievances; (2) adequate medical The therapeutic nature of clinical trial Phases II-IV also results in patients' inability to adequately assess the quality of their treatment. Randomized, doubleblind, controlled clinical trials (RCCT) will have to be conducted to evaluate the therapy of choice for a uniformly fatal disease. In an RGCT, neither the patient nor the investigator is told whether the patient is receiving a placebo or one of two or more alternate therapy regimens. Patients must be randomly allocated to treatment regimens, in order to correctly attribute pharmacodynamic effects to the vaccine under study. With a disease such as AIDS which appears to be uniformly fatal, grave questions are raised as to the ethical appropriateness of giving a trial group a placebo or a toxic or ineffective control vaccine. Further, since the RCCT may provide the only access to curative therapy, the participation of patients who have no alternatives to a Phase IV trial may be coerced. It would appear that the demands of RCCT's are not easily reconciled with the requirements for informed consent. Beyond the issue of voluntariness, there are a number of reasons why the use of high-risk subpopulations in nontherapeutic clinical trials may not permit proper characterization of vaccine effects.
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Despite these reasons, a number of rationales have been put forth to justify the recruitment of these individuals. One explanation is that male homosexuals "would be one of the top choices to participate in a vaccine trial because of their well-recognized compliance in clinical trials, such as the trial of a vaccine for hepatitis. " 6 Another rationale stems from the concern that despite confidentiality protections, participation in clinical trials may identify volunteers as being at high risk for HIV infection, due to their "lengthy period of interaction with investigators." 61 Ostensibly, the stigma of being identified as an HIV-infected individual is more easily born by members of subpopulations in which the rates of HIV infection are higher. A third suggestion is that trial data will have greater relevance if there is a chance that participants will engage in high-risk behavior and thereby challenge the vaccine: if the volunteers' immunological profile remained unaffected after continued high-risk behavior, this would serve as striking evidence of a vaccine's efficacy. 62 Finally, a more suspicious justification may favor the selection of high-risk subpopulations for clinical trials; namely, that less vulnerable individuals are unwilling to assume the risks of participation in AIDS vaccine trials. 63 These factors may manipulate the exercise of free 59 First, it will be difficult to make safety determinations as to whether an HIV infection that progresses to AIDS is a vaccine-related phenomenon or the result of a latent infection that occurred prior to the onset of the trial. See Wright, Flying Blind, 258 Sc. AM. 35, 36 (1988). Second, it may not be relevant to use data generated from high-risk populations to predict the severity of vaccine-associated disease in the general population, since there is a risk that prior infection may have compromised the immune response of a high-risk volunteer. See Novick, supra note 54, at 130. 60 Development, supra note 4, at 374 (1989) (citation omitted). 63 Until recently, no acceptable animal model, computer model, or in vivo model existed in which to demonstrate the probable efficacy of an AIDS vaccine. See supra note 11. This meant that ongoing Phase I testing was being conducted without the rudimentary protections provided by animal safety data. As one investigator rather callously noted:
People will say you shouldn't do a vaccine trial because we haven't shown it's a system that works in the monkeys with SIV or the SCID mice or whatever. I'll ask from now until that happens how many hundreds or choice by high-risk subpopulations and undermine the legitimacy of their participation as informed volunteers in clinical trials.
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As investigators try to appraise the efficacy of the vaccines currently available, "applications for human testing of experimental vaccines are piling up at the FDA .... ,65 In designing clinical trial protocols, manufacturers must acknowledge the vulnerability of potential subjects, and determine how to implement safeguards for their protection while still keeping access to trials as equitable as possible. 66 In light of the risks that volunteers will be asked to thousands of people will be infected with HIV while we do animal studies [One researcher] said in an interview that the decision against selfexperimentation was not because of any unwillingness on the researchers' part to share the risks they are asking other people to take. Rather, he said they ruled it out in the belief that scientists conducting a human experiment, and thus emotionally involved, could not be objective in giving informed consent on themselves. He cited another reason: some of the researchers might feel pressure from superiors and others to agree to be vaccinated. Despite scrupulous attention to vaccine preparation and testing, manufacturers may still face tort liability exposure once products reach the marketplace. The specter of liability has already forced many manufacturers of childhood vaccines out of the marketplace, 68 threatening a large sector of society with the risk of preventable diseases. To avoid a similar situation in the AIDS context, vaccine manufacturers must have some degree of insulation from civil tort actions.
Altman
A. Applicable Theories of Liability
It is most likely that persons seeking compensation from AIDS vaccine manufacturers will advance a legal theory of either strict liability or negligence.
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Strict liability is distinguished from negligence in that the former doctrine attaches without proof of fault by the manufacturer. Second, manufacturers should be deterred from bringing defective products to the marketplace. 75 Third, manufacturers are best situated to insure against a product's risk and distribute such costs to consumers.
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Weighing against strict liability is a fear that the development and production of valuable -products will be curtailed if manufacturers find that they are being used as "deep pockets" to compensate victims for all unforeseeable product-related injuries. While urging his colleagues to support the establishment of uniform federal rules for product liability, 77 one senator noted, Manufacturers, whose survival depends on narrow margins and, consequently, close control of costs, are confronted with one for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. The rise in product liability costs and the threat of litigation have forced many manufacturers to withdraw useful products from the market and to cancel the research and development of new, innovative and, at times, life-saving products.... Lederle Laboratories is now the sole U.S. manufacturer of the DPT vaccine for polio. Merck & Co. is the only producer of the combined measles, mumps and rubella vaccine. All others have left the field due to the threat of product liability lawsuits. 78 Acknowledging the public's interest in the development and availability of prescription drugs and vaccines, the drafters of section 402A carved out an exception for "unavoidably unsafe" products. 79 The application of comment k requires that the manufacturer has "properly prepared and marketed and [given] proper warning" 80 for the product in question. If the manufacturer has satisfied these preconditions, it will be exempt from strict liability, provided the product in question is unavoidably unsafe.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965
Underlying the comment k exemption are two significant policy rationales. First, many products may not be able to be made safe for their intended and ordinary use:
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warnings is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous ....
[T]he seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. Second, society's need for certain products is of such magnitude that the manufacturers of those products should not be subject to strict liability, despite the fact that consumers may be injured by the use of their products. During a rather confusing discussion of a draft of what was to become section 402A, a member of the institute proposed that drugs should be exempted from strict liability on the ground that it would be "against the public interest" to apply the doctrine to such products because of "the very serious tendency to stifle medical research and testing." Dean Prosser... responded that the problem was a real one, and that he had it in mind in drafting section 402A. A motion to exempt prescription drugs from the section was defeated on the suggestion of Dean Prosser that the problem could be dealt with in the comments to the section. inconsistent. Generally, courts have chosen one of two approaches: when faced with evidence that a pharmaceutical product, properly prepared and used according to the manufacturers' directions, resulted in injury to a plaintiff, they have defined the scope of comment k protection in either an expansive or a restrictive manner. An expansive application of the exception grants all prescription drugs the status of "unavoidably unsafe" products, and thereby exempts the manufacturers of all such products from strict liability based on alleged design defects in their products. 8 7 A restrictive application of the exception favors greater scrutiny of individual products before determining that a product is "unavoidably unsafe," and evaluates the importance of one or more of three determinants, namely, (1) whether the risk of the product forseeably outweighs its utility; 8 8 (2) whether the product could have been designed in a safer manner; 8 9 and (3) whether feasible alternatives for the product exist. 90 A sampling of recent decisions illustrates both of these trends.
Expansive Application of Comment k
Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp. 9 1 involved a challenge to the manufacturer of Doriden, a prescription drug for insomnia. After reviewing the plaintiff's strict liability claim, the Maryland district court granted immunity to the manufacturer on the basis of the blanket protection provided by comment k. 92 The court noted that "prescription drugs are not considered unusually dangerous under section 402A, and the manufacturer will not incur liability under that section, unless the manufacturer has failed to provide adequate warnings of the drug's possible dangers. While admonishing the trial court for its failure to hear evidence on the issue of the application of comment k "outside the presence of the jury and [making] the determination thereon," 9 6 the supreme court chose not to identify any particular factors that the trial court might have considered in making this determination as a matter of law. This decision has been interpreted as signifying the court's belief that vaccines automatically fall within the scope of comment k's protections. (1990) . In Graham, the defendant, a manufacturer of the DPT vaccine, argued that based onJohnso Kansas had adopted the expansive application of comment k, and had thereby freed vaccine manufacturers from liability for design defects as a matter of law. The district court rejected this interpretation of Johnson, stating that in its view, "the Johnson decision is not-nor is it intended to be-so far reaching." Id. at 1496. The court of appeals found theJohnson opinion "unclear" as to whether "the comment (k) defense precludes a strict liability design defect claim as a matter of law in all cases involving licensed prescription vaccines," and therefore chose to leave the district court's interpretation undisturbed. California agreed with an expansive interpretation of comment k that had been articulated in the pretrial rulings of the trial court. 1 0 ' In its appellate review, the supreme court analyzed the purposes for which the comment k exemption was implemented, 1 " 4 the alternatives to a blanket immunity approach, 10 5 and the routine application of comment k in other courts, 10 6 and concluded that comment k should exempt manufacturers of prescription drugs from strict liability arising from claims alleging the defective design of their products. 10 7 Although acknowledging the appeal of a more restrictive application of comment k (i.e., one that would seek to evaluate pharmaceutical products on a caseby-case basis), 10 8 the supreme court recognized that such an application would place manufacturers in a legal quandary, 10 9 and 101 The court provided a helpful analysis of the distinctions between the two types of defects:
A product has a "manufacturing defect" if and only if the product caused a plaintiff's injury because it deviated from the manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line.
In contrast, in the case of a design defect the injury producing agent is common to all products of a certain line, and the defect lies in the original design or model. A product has a design defect if and only if: (a) the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably expected manner, or (b) the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk or danger inherent in such design. would also impede "significant advances in scientific knowledge, discouraging the development of new and improved drugs to combat disease."
Id. at 1335 (citations and footnotes omitted
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The view that manufacturers of prescription pharmaceuticals should be exempt from strict liability has not been consistently adopted by all courts. The following cases illustrate a divergent trend to remove the protective blanket of immunity from such manufacturers, and instead use a restrictive application of comment k that requires the case-by-case evaluation of pharmaceutical products.
As a review of these cases will indicate, the restrictive application of comment k is often problematic. In addition to the lack of uniformity among courts regarding the factors to be considered in determining whether comment k is applicable, it also may not be clear whether it is the judge or the factfinder who should apply any test that is developed."' 1 side effects because a trial court could decide ... that in fact another product which was available on the market would have accomplished the same result. Further, the question of the superiority of one drug over another would have to be decided not in the abstract but in reference to the plaintiff, since the advantages of a drug cannot be isolated from the condition of a particular patient.... [D]ifferent trial judges might reach different conclusions as to whether the same drug should be measured by strict liability principles, because the determination in each case depends on the evidence as well as the subjective determination of the judge. (1990) . Here, the appeals court declined to state that the district court had abused its discretion by not holding a "mini-trial" in order to determine the application of comment k. The court noted that "mini-trials can result in 'undue delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Id. at 1405 n.10 (quoting Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 935 (10th Cir. 1987)). The lower court had concluded that the comment k assessment was one for the court to make, but one that could be made in the presence of the jury since the evidence "will be the same evidence from which thejury will determine negligence." Graham. 
Restrictive Application of Comment k
In restrictively applying comment k, courts have identified one or more of three requisites that must be established before it can be determined that a product is unavoidably unsafe, and its manufacturer deserving of protection from strict liability design defect claims. 1 12 Each of these will be considered in turn below.
a. Whether the Risk of the Product Forseeably Outweighs Its Utility
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories n l 3 typifies the early case law developing a risk versus benefit balancing test for the analysis of liability claims involving prescription drugs. 114 In Reyes, the Fifth Circuit adopted such a test for a manufacturer of the Sabin oral polio vaccine. Although the court recognized the unavoidably unsafe nature of the vaccine, it chose to consider whether the vaccine was "so unsafe that marketing it at all [was] 'unreasonably dangerous per se. ' "1 1 5 On balance, the court found that the "legitimate public interest in [the vaccine's] availability" outweighed its risks.
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Continuing its risk/benefit analysis, the Reyes court also considered whether the vaccine had been "introduced into the stream of commerce without sufficient safeguards." 1 1 7 Concluding that the manufacturer had not met its duty to warn individual consumers about the risk posed by the vaccine, the court found the this failure "itself present [ 
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preme Court clearly contemplated the weighing of a product's risks and benefits prior to making the determination of unavoidable unsafety necessary for comment k application. The court stated that in order for a manufacturer to prevail in securing comment k protection, the judge or the factfinder would have to be apprised of convincing evidence that the product at issue survived a risk/benefit test. 121 Pointing out that comment k refers "to 'some' products which are avoidably unsafe," 122 the court refused to grant blanket protection to all pharmaceutical products. Voicing a concern that would later be rationalized by the Brown court, 123 the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "[i]t does not serve society that an unavoidably unsafe product, which has occasional or fractious benefit, should enjoy insulation from strict liability in tort when the product's predominant effects are detrimental to individual and 121 The court noted that "[c]learly, the comment contemplates a weighing of the benefit of the product against its risk. Obviously, for comment k to apply, the benefit must outweigh the risk. This weighing process should consider the value of the benefit, the seriousness of the risk, and the likelihood of both." Toner, 112 Idaho at 337, 732 P.2d at 306 (citations omitted).
The court placed the burden of proving comment k's application on the manufacturer, stating that "comment k is an affirmative defense to a claim based on strict liability." Id. at 339, 732 P.2d at 308.
Note that because it was not presented with the issue, the Toner court did not address the question of "whether the judge orjury ought to determine the application of comment k to a particular product." Id. at 339 n.9, 732 P.2d at 308 n.9. However, the court noted that
[s]ome courts and commentators, emphasizing the factual determinations necessary, leave it to thejury. Others, concerned with the policy implications of the decision, would have the court decide comment k's application as a matter of law. Either way, the decision of the applicability of comment k pertains only to claims based on defective design, and not to those based on defective manufacture or inadequate warning. The latter two raise questions of fact to be decided by the jury.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1147-48 (noting that issues underlying comment k are of law and policy, and thus best suited to judicial review). 122 Toner, 112 Idaho at 339, 732 P.2d at 308. 123 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. public safety." 124 The court held that based on the best available evidence at the time of product distribution, "the scales must clearly tip in favor of the benefits for comment k to apply." 125 The comment would be applied on a case-by-case basis, "when the situation calls for it." 126 In Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 12 7 the Oregon Supreme Court endeavored to resolve some of the uncertainty relating to comment k's application under Oregon law. Although declining to make a determination as to whether the DPT vaccine at issue was unavoidably unsafe, and thereby deserving of comment k protection, 128 the court noted that such a determination would raise "[i]ssues of the vaccine's efficacy, the degree of risk attending its use, and the extent to which it is in fact 'unavoidably unsafe'.... 1 2 9 Once again an expansive application of comment k was rejected in favor of one which would examine and ostensibly balance the risks and benefits of the manufactured product.
A risk/benefit approach to identifying unavoidably unsafe products was also set out by the Eighth Circuit in Hill v. Searle Laboratories. 1 30 Evaluating comment k's application to a medical device, the CU-7 copper intrauterine device, the court determined that it was not the intent of the drafters of comment k to "grant all manufacturers of prescription drugs a blanket exception to strict 128 See Senn, 305 Or. at 263 n.4, 751 P.2d at 218 n.4 ("We agree with the Idaho Supreme Court's statement that 'it is not for a court sitting on appeal to [determine whether a vaccine is entitled to comment k protection]. The determination would require a full evidentiary hearing such as only a trial court can provide.'"). 129 Id. at 263 n.4, 751 P.2d at 219 n. 
b. Whether the Product Could Have Been Designed in a Safer Manner
In Toner, ' 33 the Idaho Supreme Court articulated an additional factor to be considered in determining whether a product was unavoidably unsafe and its manufacturer thereby encompassed under comment k's protection: the inherent risks of the product at issue had to be inescapable. The court explained that this meant that "the design [of the product] must be as safe as the best available testing and research permits."
34 Presumably the court believed that either the judge or the jury was entitled to review state-of-the-art methodology on a case-by-case basis, and determine whether a product's benefits might have been achieved in another manner.1 3 5
c. Whether Feasible Alternatives for the Product Exist
In Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 13 6 a non-vaccine case involving the oral contraceptive Ortho-Novum 2, the court affirmed a jury verdict that permitted an expanded reading of the plaintiff's defective design claim. The court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that because a similar, equally effective, and safer contraceptive had been available, the "risk posed by the 100 mcg. pill outweighed whatever advantages, if any, it 131 Id. at 1069. 132 Id. (citations omitted); see also Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 123 (Colo. 1983) (stating that "in order to fall within the comment k exception, not only should an unavoidably unsafe product carry a unique or profound benefit, but that benefit should extend to the vast majority of users of the product" The plaintiffs in Toner argued that a viable fractionated cell DPT vaccine was available, posed a lower risk, and was immunologically superior to the defendant's whole cell vaccine.
1 39 This prompted the Idaho Supreme court to require that in order for comment k to apply, "there must be, at the time of the subject product's distribution, no feasible alternative design which on balance accomplishes the subject product's purpose with a lesser risk." 140 However, the court left room for the exercise of some license in making this determination. It recognized that even if a safer or more effective substitute product were available, it would not necessarily be superior. If a riskier product satisfied broader social utility goals it could survive the "feasible alternative" test. The evaluation of a purported alternative design and the subject product's design should consider the magnitude of the subject product's risk that the alternative avoids, the financial costs of the compared designs, the benefits of the compared designs, and the relative safety of the compared designs, including any new risk that the alternative would pose. Nov. 26, 1990 ). In Ackley, the court explained that in order to defeat a claim that a product is unavoidably unsafe, the challenger must show an alternative that is Pareto-superior, that is, a product that is at least as effective and also provides less risk. Appellants cannot state a claim for strict liability merely by showing an alternative that provides an alleged modicum of reduction of risk at the expense of some loss of effectiveness.
Id. (citations omitted); see also
Id. (citations omitted).
1991]
C. Application of Comment k to an AIDS Vaccine Design Defect
Given the diversity of approaches the courts have taken when applying comment k, it is impossible to predict exactly which, if any, of the criteria discussed above will guide individual courts as they determine whether an AIDS vaccine is unavoidably unsafe, and whether the manufacturer will be held strictly liable for injuries caused by this product. If manufacturers can survive the less solicitous, restrictive application of comment k, then theoretically they will be exempt from strict liability for design defects under any analysis.
An AIDS vaccine is likely to satisfy the three conditions which various courts, using the restrictive application, have required for demonstrating the quality of "unavoidable unsafety," the precondition for comment k immunity. 142 First, an AIDS vaccine should easily satisfy any risk/benefit requirement, since it will provide protection from HIV infection and reduce the incidence of AIDS, a fatal disease for which there is no satisfactory treatment. Because the development and production of an AIDS vaccine are of paramount importance, the interest in vaccine availability is likely to outweigh the policy rationales for imposing strict liability on manufacturers.
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In addition, some of the policy rationales may be inapplicable to an AIDS vaccine. For example, it may not be feasible for manufacturers to assess adequately the risks associated with an AIDS vaccine at the time of its distribution, and thus the manufacturer may not be in any better position to insure against or absorb the liability costs certain to be associated with this product if it is subject to a strict liability analysis. 144 Second, it is likely that FDA oversight will facilitate manufacturer compliance with standards sufficient to ensure that vaccines which reach the marketplace embody the safest design known at the time of their distribution. If design defect claims against AIDS manufacturers parallel the -cases brought to date against DPT and polio vaccine manufacturers, such claims will be based either on the 142 See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
143 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 144 As the California Assembly noted, the development costs of a vaccine may not be recoupable for the manufacturer. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.51(a) (West Supp. 1990 ). In addition, casualty insurers may be reluctant to provide coverage for a product having risks that do not lend themselves to actuarial calculations. See Berger, supra xaote 76, at 288.
premise that a selected combination of vaccines is inappropriate, 145 or that an acellular or fractionated cell vaccine would have been safer than the manufactured product. 146 Unless there is evidence that either of these allegedly unsafe characteristics could have been avoided without eliminating the vaccine's usefulness, it is unlikely that an AIDS vaccine manufacturer will be found to have ignored safer design alternatives. The existence of these allegedly safe characteristics should become apparent to, and be corrected by manufacturers during the course of toxicology studies and carefully constructed clinical trials, and the FDA should become aware of such problems in its evaluations of clinical data. 147 Thus, the vaccine which a manufacturer markets should, with the supervision of the FDA, be of the safest design known at the time of distribution.
Third, although the existence of feasible alternatives may affect marketing decisions by AIDS vaccine manufacturers, with respect to 146 See supra text accompanying note 139. 147 In attempting to determine the scope of their liability for design defects, manufacturers may, however, encounter two difficulties somewhat unique to the AIDS vaccine effort. First, the long period of viral incubation prior to manifestation of the disease means that injured plaintiffs may only be identifiable many years after a vaccine is administered. In design defect litigation brought long after product distribution, a jury will have to harmonize an array of subjective determinations, all based on hindsight, as to which early vaccine designs offered greater safety and efficacy.
Second, difficulties for manufacturers may arise from the secrecy that has been attached to the vaccine research effort. See Foreman, Secrecy in AIDS Research, Boston Globe, Apr. 13, 1987, at 43, col. 1. One result of this secrecy is unwitting exposure to future liabilityif evidence of the experience attendant to particular vaccine designs is selectively distributed among scientists and physicians. As has been noted, [m] anufacturers are deemed to know whatever information is available in the scientific community. This means that they may not avoid liability by neglecting to keep up with the state of research. At the same time, it does not require them to know the unknowable. Thus the information for which they are likely to be held responsible should be limited to that available in the literature and presented at scientific meetings.
pricing strategies or target groups, 148 it seems unlikely to cause every potential manufacturer to withdraw from the market altogether. Until regulatory approval is granted for the marketing of at least two AIDS vaccines, alternative concerns are truly speculative; the superiority of a single vaccine obviously cannot be determined in the abstract.
D. Comment k and the Manufacturer's Duty to Warn
A final legal issue for manufacturers concerns the scope of their duty to warn under comment k.
14 9 Case law 1 50 and legal com-148 For example, liability problems would probably be avoided if a manufacturer produced a vaccine that showed occasional adverse effects when administered to an elderly population, but was the only effective vaccine for children. 149 Even when it has been established that a product is unavoidably unsafe, a manufacturer may still not be entitled to the comment k exemption if it failed to warn of known risks associated with the product. Under comment k, the failure to warn analysis is a negligence-based inquiry. As such, it differs slightly from the manner in which failure to warn is reviewed under common law strict liability standards. The test stated in comment k is to be distinguished from strict liability for failure to warn. Although both concepts identify failure to warn as the basis of liability, comment k imposes liability only if the manufacturer knew or should have known of the defect at the time the product was sold or distributed. Under strict liability, the reason why the warning was not issued is irrelevant, and the manufacturer is liable even if it neither knew nor could have known of the defect about which the warning was required. Thus, comment k, by focusing on the blameworthiness of the manufacturer, sets forth a test which sounds in negligence, while imposition of liability for failure to warn without regard to the reason for such failure is consistent with strict liability since it asks only whether the product that caused injury contained a defect. Id. (citations omitted); see also DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 229 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Under a negligence theory the issue is whether the defendant exercised due care in formulating and updating the warning, while under a strict liability theory the issue is whether the lack of a proper warning made the product unreasonably dangerous." (quoting Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980))). mentary' 5 ' suggest that the sufficiency of a manufacturer's warnings depends on whether it reflects the manufacturer's knowledge of the risks associated with the product at the time of distribution. This view is consistent with Gommentj of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which limits a manufacturer's duty to warn to situations in which it "has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge of ... the danger." 1 5 2 Based on this interpretation, AIDS vaccine manufacturers should be absolved of strict liability for failure to warn of unforeseeable risks. In warning of foreseeable risks, manufacturers may not be responsible for warning consumers directly due to the protections of the "learned intermediary" doctrine. 153 If it is foreseeable, however, that the vaccine will be administered without the intervention of a physician, or if the manufacturer fails to warn properly the physicians serving as intermediaries, the doctrine will not protect 97 N.J. 429, 453, 479 A.2d 374, 387 (1984) (imputing knowledge of "reliable information generally available or reasonably obtainable in the industry or in the particular field involved"). 1635,1642 (1983) (arguing that courts have retained a requirement of foreseeability of risk before manufacturers are required to warn in § 402A cases to avoid requiring "a product manufacturer to warn of defects that were scientifically undiscoverable at the time the product was marketed").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A commentj (1965).
153 First adopted in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966), the learned intermediary doctrine holds that the manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn if makes "reasonable efforts" to warn doctors of the possibility of side effects. See id. It is based on the rationale that [pirescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies then, who must warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the counter, in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as a "learned intermediary" between manufacturer and consumer. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276; see also Comment, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of a Vaccine against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 957-61 (1988) (discussing the application of the learned intermediary doctrine to AIDS vaccine manufacturers). against liability.
1 5 4 In addition, in order to remain insulated from liability, manufacturers must warn of product risks in a manner consistent within the industry. 155 Finally, evidence of a failure to warn which rises to the level of "malice, wantonness, or reckless indifference from which malice could be inferred" may support the imposition of punitive damages on the manufacturer.
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In summary, although the tort law fails short of completely protecting potential vaccine manufacturers from strict liability, the extent of their liability should be minimized by the critical need for their products. Once a broad range of AIDS vaccines becomes available, it is less clear, however, whether all such vaccines will meet the unavoidably unsafe standard. More rigorous risk-utility evaluations will occur as each successive vaccine becomes available. Legislative intervention may be required to encourage manufacturers to enter the market. Givens is particularly interesting because it points out how broad the scope of a "proper warning" can become. The court determined that, although the manufacturer had not misrepresented the safety of its oral polio vaccine to the administering physician, the product warning trivialized the risk because the physician had not felt sufficiently compelled to disclose the one-in-three million chance of injury to his patient. See id. at 1345.
155 See Tatur, 795 F.2d at 928 (recognizing that although the defendant had revised its package insert in response to an FDA directive, "no letters were written to physicians and no bulletins [were] sent to [the manufacturer's] detailmen, nor were detailmen told to bring the matter to the attention of physicians"). The court regarded the manufacturer's "method of calling attention to a change in warning indicating a higher risk of serious adverse reaction than previously described" as being "inconsistent with the practice of other drug manufacturers." Id. Note, however, that because the standard of liability for failure to warn is negligence, remedial changes in warning literature will be excluded under the rules of evidence. 
A. Federal Legislative Efforts
Federal legislation may ultimately be used to achieve uniform vaccine liability standards that strike a balance between the policy objectives of adequately protecting consumers and encouraging the manufacture of socially desirable products. Two recent pieces of legislation may serve as models for future legislative development at the federal level.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
The federal government's most recent activity in legislative vaccine regulation consists of the creation of the National Vaccine Program (NVP) as mandated by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVI). l 5 8 'The stated purpose of the NCVI is "to achieve optimal prevention of human infectious diseases through immunization and.., optimal prevention against adverse reactions to vaccines."159 Another program created by the NOVI is the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 1 6 0 which was designed to provide a "no-fault" compensation scheme for those injured by any of the vaccines required by law for entrance to public school (vaccines for childhood infectious diseases such as iphtheria and tetanus). Although the legislation directed that tort law would provide a secondary remedy for the victims of vaccine-related injuries, it stipulated that such persons must seek compensation 161 through channels specified in the legislation prior to filing 158 42 U.S.C. § § 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1988). 159 Id. § 30Oaa-1. 160 See id. § 300aa-10(a). This program appears to have decreased the number of lawsuits filed against manufacturers, but it is too early to know whether the initial trend will continue. 1 63 It is also unclear whether the program can be expanded to include AIDS vaccines. Two commentators take a rather pessimistic look at the potential for the NCVI to offer protection in the AIDS context:
The inclusion of a new, elective vaccine would require acceptance of a much broader principle of social responsibility for any vaccine-related injury. There is also a practical obstacle to extending the NCVI act to cover AIDS vaccines. In order to simplify the process of determining eligibility for compensation, the act presumes that certain injuries have been caused by the vaccine. It will... be virtually impossible to identify... the times of onset in order to establish a credible schedule of compensable injuries before any AIDS vaccine is tested or distributed. 
The Product Liability Reform Act
Additional federal legislative efforts may take place though the passage of some form of a uniform products liability act. 165 One such effort, the Products Liability Reform Act, is currently under review in the Senate. 1 6 6 As it currently stands, this bill will permit drug manufacturers to use FDA approval of a drug as an absolute defense against punitive damages, as long as the manufacturer has not committed fraud during the approval process. compliance with FDA standards to create a presumption of product safety, 1 6 8 it is only a partial solution. Products designed to FDA standards will still not be "liability-proof," and manufacturers have yet to obtain a yardstick by which to predict their ultimate exposure level. It will be interesting to see what other protections the federal government will be willing to offer drug manufacturers, and whether such protections will solve the liability crisis facing AIDS vaccine manufacturers, or instead create problems of their own.
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B. Applicability of the Federal Preemption Doctrine
Although it has not been successfully argued to date, 17 0 another theory may eventually assist vaccine manufacturers in their attempts to define the boundaries of potential AIDS vaccine liability: the federal preemption doctrine could limit the liability of manufacturers sued for alleged improper vaccine design, testing, and labeling, or for any other activities that have been sanctione4 by the FDA.
The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the supremacy clause, 17 1 and it serves to define the boundaries of power between the federal government and the states. Federal preemption of state law occurs when the spheres of state and federal sovereignty intersect to the degree that the autonomy of the state, and its power as a regulatory body must be displaced. Preemption may either be "express, " 1 2 where an activity is explicitly regulated in the language of a federal statute or regulation, or it may be "implied, where (1) state law directly conflicts with federal requirements; 174 (2) the federal regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that it can be assumed to be controlling; 75 (3) public policy rationales support an inference of preemption; 176 (4) a review of the legislative history of a federal statute or regulation favors a finding of preemption;177 or (5) the federal government has made a conscious decision that a particular activity not be regulated. In the context of AIDS vaccine regulation, the key question with respect to preemption will be whether this doctrine can be inferred from the extent of federal involvement 183 or the scope of federal interests in uniform regulation or in the availability of this product. Unfortunately, in asking courts to recognize a preemption argument, manufacturers will face a judicial environment that has not been particularly hospitable. With a few exceptions, 184 181 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,247 (1959) ("The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.").
182 See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 718 ("Given the presumption that state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist with federal regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety.").
18s Under either the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), see supra text accompanyingnote 7, or the Public Health Services Act (PHSA), see supra note 10.
IM See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988). Although the circuit court's decision reversed a lower court decision that had fully embraced the preemption argument, the appeals court did recognize that with respect to the adequacy of the product warning, the manufacturer had a compelling argument for preemption:
It would be patently inconsistent for a state then to hold the manufacturer liable for including that precise warning when the manufacturer would otherwise be liable for not including it. Thus assuming that the FDA has processed all the relevant and available information in arriving at the prescribed warning, its decision as to the proper wording must preempt by implication that of a state. [T]he comprehensiveness of the FDA regulation as to DPT labeling evidence a preemptive intent to occupy the field and precludes state regulation. ... The contents and wording of these product inserts are extensively regulated and controlled by the FDA. Furthermore, the language in the product insert cannot be used or changed without prior FDA approval. Thus, the comprehensive nature of the FDA regulations evidences preemptive intent to establish implied preemption as to the labeling/warning of DPT in the present case.
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The public's interest in a uniform regulatory scheme has been addressed on several occasions by the FDA.
19°
Concerns that manufacturer liability for common law tort claims may have regulatory consequences that ultimately deny consumers access to important products have also been discussed in many contexts.
1 91
It appears that most courts, believing that the federal regulations establish only minimum regulatory standards, 192 will reject manufacturers' preemption arguments. Choosing to minimize the effect that denying preemption will have on undermining the federal regulatory scheme, 193 they will instead focus upon their reluctance to deprive injured plaintiffs of a civil remedy.
19 4 This attitude will force AIDS vaccine manufacturers who wish to make the preemption argument to decide whether to seek review of their preemption claims by the Supreme Court. As this is a forum in which the presumption against federal preemption has consistently been recognized, manufacturers are not likely to be successful. . 1988) . 193 Courts have specifically downplayed the importance of maintaining uniformity in the regulatory scheme. See Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1493 (urging that " [u] niformity is a goal to be achieved in the interest of more fully protecting citizens from unsafe products-it is not to be achieved by sacrificing public health").
194 See Abbot 844 F.2d at 1112 (noting that since no federal remedy exists, the presumption against preemption is greater); Wack v. Lederle Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 123, 127-28 (N.D. Ohio 1987) ("The Court is also reluctant to hold implied preemption applies to the plaintiffs' design defect, inadequate warnings and punitive damage claims because such action would effectively deprive the plaintiffs of any civil remedy."). 195 " [F] ederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive ond, the statute: (1) appropriated research monies for the subsidization of AIDS clinical vaccine trials; (2) created an AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund (the fund); 199 and (3) guaranteed that if fewer than 500,000 units of vaccine were sold, the state would purchase the difference between the actual number sold and 500,000 units of vaccine at a maximum price of $20 per unit. 200 Although early versions of the statute specifically addressed the issue of potential manufacturer liability, codifying a restrictive application of comment k, 2°1 this portion of the statute has since been repealed. 20 2 The legislature has instead created an AIDS Vaccine Injury Compensation Policy Review Task Force (the task force) 2 3 to study and make recommendations on the process of compensating victims through the fund, the procedures for operation of the fund, the method and amount of manufacturer payment into the fund, and "the procedural relationship between a be utilized, to the extent feasible, in cooperation with the FDA. 10 members appointed by the Governor, of which two shall be from a list provided by the California Trial Lawyers Association, one from the State Department of Health Services, the Director of Finance, one unspecified member, and one attorney with experience and expertise in products liability and negligence defense work, two representing recognized groups which represent victims of vaccine induced injuries or AIDS victims, or both, and two representing manufacturers actively engaged in developing an AIDS vaccine. In addition four Members of the Legislature or their designees shall be appointed to the task force, two of which shall be appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly and two of which shall be appointed by the Senate Rules Committee. The chairperson of the task force shall be appointed by the Governor from the membership of the task force.
potential victim's claim through the fund and a court claim made against the manufacturer." 20 4
Given the broad spectrum of interests represented on the task force, there is no reason to expect that any future recommendations made to the legislature with respect to manufacturer liability will be unduly burdensome. Presumably the broad protections established by the California Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior Court 20 5 will guide legislative action in this area. In addition, the other guarantees of this statute, in particular the provision establishing an insured market for potential vaccine products, will certainly serve as direct incentives for manufacturers: "By guaranteeing a minimum market, California will enable manufacturers to spread their fixed costs over a greater number of units, thus lowering the average cost per unit.
" 2°6
It is too early to know whether the California statute will speed development, limit manufacturer liability, and enable consumers to have access to a beneficial vaccine, or will put California on a collision course with the FDA. So far, the FDA has indicated that it will accept California trial data, yet in truth, the FDA may not be enamored of sharing responsibility with the states. In describing the FDA's position on the aggressive approach by California, one FDA employee noted that "sponsors would suffer, perhaps, from not having FDA input at an earlier stage." 20 7 Another noted that " [t] here is a point to be gained through a more coordinated approach to the entire effort." 2 0 8 Although it does not appear that the FDA is overly enthusiastic about working with the states in their vaccine efforts, 20 9 it is heartening to see that concern over the AIDS crisis has been persuasive enough to encourage attempts at improving the prospects for a vaccine.
CONCLUSION
The eventual success of efforts to develop an AIDS vaccine will require greater awareness by investigators of the problems associated with the use of human subjects in clinical testing. These problems are made all the more significant by the immense public pressure for progress on AIDS research-pressure that may give rise to human exploitation in the rush to bring a vaccine to the marketplace. Successful vaccine development may also require legislative intervention or greater judicial protection to ensure that the marketplace remains hospitable to manufacturers.
A united effort must be made by manufacturers, regulators, and other interested parties to streamline the process of vaccine development so that a safe and effective product can reach the marketplace quickly.
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